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Abstract
Euro area data show a positive connection between sovereign and bank risk, which increases
with banks’ and sovereign long run fragility. We build a macro model with banks subject to
incentive problems and liquidity risk (in the form of liquidity based banks’ runs) which provides
a link between endogenous bank capital and macro and policy risk. Our banks also invest in
risky government bonds used as capital buﬀer to self-insure against liquidity risk. The model can
replicate the positive connection between sovereign and bank risk observed in the data. Central
bank liquidity policy, through full allotment policy, is successful in stabilizing the spiraling
feedback loops between bank and sovereign risk.
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11 Introduction
There is by now a widely shared understanding that one of the elements producing the escalation
behind the euro area sovereign debt crisis has been the tight and intricate link between sovereign
and bank risk, which resulted by the extensive exposure of banks onto the secondary market for
government bonds.
Of course the link has no univocal causality. In the aftermath of the 2007 crises many euro area
governments had spent considerable public resources to conduct explicit or implicit bail out policies
of banks under distress; in many cases those actions had put public ﬁnances on an un-sustainable
path, which eventually triggered a conﬁdence crisis on government bonds with skyrocketing spreads
in a few but important cases (notably Greece, Ireland and Portugal). However, more recently the
reverse causality is becoming worrisome particularly for policy makers and ﬁnancial regulators. In
most euro area countries banks have invested widely in government bonds. This happened primarily
for two reasons. First, to satisfy regulatory or internal capital requirements banks shall invest a
certain fraction of capital into liquid-safe assets (Tier 1 capital). The loss in balance sheet values
ensuing the 2007 crisis forced banks to increase the fraction of Tier 1 capital. In 2007-2008 euro
area government bonds represented a signiﬁcant part of Tier 1 capital due to the small spread
diﬀerentials between various national bonds and the German bund. There was also a second reason
which induced many euro area banks to invest highly in government bond in the aftermath of the
2007 crisis. While prior to this date several banks had the opportunity to invest in triple A asset
backed securities1, as the market for asset backed securities and other derivatives soared, most
banks turned to other assets to replenish Tier 1 capital, primarily government bonds. Notice that
government bonds, contrary to stock market equities, were also assigned low risk weights into the
regulatory requirements, hence they were oﬃcially recognized as part of the Tier 1 capital. When
the conﬁdence loss hit many government bond markets in 2009-2010, risk spreads on several national
bonds climbed, thereby implicitly increasing banks’ exposure to macroeconomic and policy risk.
Such mechanism can clearly trigger a feedback loop: as banks’ risk climbs, oﬃcial regulations induce
1Asset backed securities had been initially conceived as a mean of raising banks’ liquidity beyond that obtained
through regular checking and saving deposits. As during the 2000s more and more ABS were assigned triple A
ratings, most banks around the globe started to consider them as a mean of safe (due to the seniority status) but
lucrative investment.
2intermediaries to hold increasing fractions of government bonds2, whose risk in turn puts banks’
balance sheets under further stress. This self-reinforcing propagation mechanism eﬀectively induced
central banks to intervene in secondary markets for government bonds. In the case of the ECB
this was done mainly through full allotment interventions on repo markets, operations which per
se helped to guarantee that such easing of liquidity would not aﬀect long run money growth. Even
so, monetary policy interventions to buy bonds (from banks) in the secondary market at distorted
prices (lower risk spreads) eﬀectively produced an implicit transfer to the banking system.
We build a macro model consistent with the main facts reported above to assess the likelihood
and the extent that banks-sovereign interaction produces system wide risk. Our benchmark econ-
omy builds on Faia [1] by adding liquidity needs in the banking sector for precautionary motives.
First banks serve the function of delegated monitor of investment project on behalf of uninformed
investors. Following Holmstrom and Tirole [4], within this function banks face a dual moral hazard
problem. On the one side, banks face moral hazard with entrepreneurs who run risky projects
and receive private beneﬁts by projects with low probability of success: for this reasons banks
have to exert costly monitoring. Uninformed investors face moral hazard problems with banks,
which might decide to save on monitoring costs, thereby transferring risk onto investors. Those
mis-incentives are disciplined through a three party contract. Importantly however the presence
of moral hazard on both sides of the balance sheet prevents banks from insuring away risk. Bank
capital, chosen endogenously by banks, serves the purpose of discipline device for such intrinsic
risk: the Modigliani Miller fails to hold for banks’ ﬁnancing decisions and intermediary capital
acquires a special role which requires the payment of rents or intermediation premia. Such frictions
on the intermediation services render the interaction between intermadiary capital, investment and
the business cycle prone to instability: negative ﬁnancial or liquidity shocks increase bank capital
scarcity, raise intermediary premia and reduce available credit to ﬁrms. This type of intermediary
driven credit crunch renders the model suitable to analyze the link between risk on sovereign bonds,
an asset which can be part of banks’ portfolios, and instability in the intermediation sector and the
2Eﬀectively the risk factors assigned to government bonds by regulatory capital requirements such as Basel III
had remained low throughout the euro area sovereign debt crisis. One possible explanation behind the inaction to
adjust the risk factors could likely be due to the fact that, in absence of alternative high rated assets to invest upon,
regulators felt that an increase in the risk factors assigned to government bonds might have implicitly pushed several
banks into a technical default.
3impact of this link on the macroeconomy. Additionally, notice that in our model intermediary’s
capital in our model behaves counter-cyclical (it rises in recessions) in response to both macro
shocks and policy risk shocks: this link is in line with empirical evidence and renders the model
suitable for policy analysis.
While fundamental risk is disciplined through the three party contract and by the intermediary
premia as explained above, we assume that liquidity risk might still emerge. The emergence of news
or imprecise signals on banks’ health might induce liquidity based deposit withdrawals3. Sudden
deposit withdrawals put liquidity pressure on banks, which in turn need to self-insure by holding
signiﬁcant buﬀers of assets with uncorrelated risk, namely government bonds. This results in a
form of precautionary saving. The higher the uncertainty about expected bank returns among
investors, the higher the buﬀers required in the banking sector. Higher liquidity buﬀers result in
higher liquidity hoarding, as larger fraction of bank funding are invested in government bonds. This
in turn results in a contraction of credit supply to ﬁrms. Onto this picture we also insert a stylized
ﬁscal sector. We consider the case of risky government bonds, with a geometrically decreasing
coupon4. A negative ﬁscal shock by precipitating a fall in bond prices has two eﬀects. Firstly,
more bonds are needed to provide a equivalent collateral value in the interbank market, so banks’
demand for bonds increases. Secondly, unexpected falls in government bond price lead to trading
losses that hit banks capital positions and entail durable credit supply contraction5.
The framework outlined so far is ﬁrst used to asses the transmission of standard macro shock.
To asses the role of the link between sovereign risk and the presence of government bonds onto
banks’ balance sheet, we compare impulse response functions of the model with and without sov-
ereign premia. We ﬁnd that the introduction of sovereign risk exacerbate the eﬀects of shocks:
negative shocks force banks to increase capital buﬀer; when this is done using risky government
3Deposit withdrawals in our model do not produce economy wide destruction of resources, as depositors simply
move funds from one bank to the other.
4A proper account of government default risk would require computing risk spreads based on the actual probability
of default as resulting from the fulﬁllment of the discounted government budget constraint. A full account would
actually also require to take into consideration the possibility of strategic default. However since our model features
a rich banking sector, we decided to do parsimonious assumptions on the ﬁscal side. Such parsimony will actually
produce more conservative, rather than exaggerated, results in terms of economy-wide risk ampliﬁcation.
5Liquidity buﬀers are carried from period to period by bankers, who take alone all losses and gains realized on
the bonds. For example, proﬁts made on government bond holdings do not lead to lower rates for bank’s customers
or higher rates for bank’s investors: bankers alone enjoy the beneﬁt.
4bonds, a feedback loop is activated that ampliﬁes the recessionary consequences of macro shocks.
Importantly we also ﬁnd that the correlation between bank and sovereign risk characterizing the
response of our model to liquidity and/or macro shocks, can replicate the equivalent correlation
found in EU data. Finally, we assess the role of central bank liquidity provisions as stability in-
ducing device. Central bank liquidity provision can have real eﬀects in our model (by enhancing
credit supply) only when accepting repos in government bonds at a distorted price, namely the
price associated with a lower probability of sovereign default. At this price banks can borrow more
from the central bank than they could on the market against the same quantity of bonds, hence
liquidity buﬀers required are smaller and credit supply is higher. In the short run liquidity provi-
sions enhance credit supply so it generally reduces the ampliﬁcation of macro shocks and reduces
the correlation between sovereign and bank risk6.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 shows
quantitative properties of the model primarily in his ability to match bank and sovereign risk
correlation as observed in the data. Section 4 analyzes the role of central banks interventions onto
sovereign bond markets. Section 5 concludes. Appendices, ﬁgures and tables follow.
2 A Macro Model with Endogenous Bank Capital and Liquidity
Risk
The macro model economy is populated by three type of agents: households/workers/uninformed
investors, entrepreneurs and banks7. Production of ﬁnal goods takes place in a competitive sector
which employes capital and labour. A second sector produces physical capital goods: ﬁrms in
this sector obtain funds from banks to ﬁnance investment projects. Banks obtain funds through
deposits, but they also invest their bank capital. A dual moral hazard arises between banks and
entrepreneurs requiring funds on the one side and between banks and depositors (also referred to
us uninformed investors) on the other. Given the presence of agency problems, full risk insurance
against projects’ failure is not possible. However the fundamental risk arising from the credit
6There is an implicit risk transfer from private banks to the central bank balance sheet, however it is assumed that
the latter cannot default. Therefore risk on central bank balance sheet does not carry resource costs in our model.
7The latter two are ﬁnitely lived and risk neutral agents: the assumption prevents buﬀer asset accumulation that
would overcome the need of external ﬁnance. It also allows aggregation via simple averaging of individual optimizing
decisions.
5relation can be disciplined through a three party contract and the endogenous choice of bank
capital. The bank also faces liquidity risk due to an exogenous probability of sudden deposit
withdrawals, which is triggered by the arrival of news (imprecise signals) on banks’ balance sheet
conditions. Banks can self-insure against this liquidity risk by holding assets with uncorrelated
risk, such as government bonds. This implicitly reduces banks available funding for ﬁrms’ lending.
The ﬁscal sector features exogenous government spending and lump taxes and accumulates risky
bonds.
2.1 Households
A continuum of households consume, work in the production sector, invest in bank deposits and
physical capital. They take consumption decisions to maximize the following lifetime expected
utility:
E0
∞ ￿
t=0
βt {U(Ct) − V (Ht)} (1)
where Ct denotes households consumption and Ht labour hours. Their budget constraint, in
real terms, reads as follows:
Ct + qtIh
t + Dt+1 = (1 + rn
t )Dt + ZtKh
t +
Wt
Pt
Ht − τt (2)
where qt denotes the price of capital, Ih
t denotes capital investment done by households, (1+rn
t )
is the gross nominal interest rate received on deposits, Dt are real deposits, Zt is the real rental
rate of capital, Kh
t is the amount of physical capital invested by households, Wt
Pt Ht is real labour
income and τt are lump sum taxes. The capital investment evolves according to:
Kh
t+1 = (1 − δ)Kh
t + Ih
t (3)
The ﬁrst order conditions of the above problem read as follows:
u ´ (Ct) = βEt
￿
u ´ (Ct+1)
(1 + rn
t )Pt
Pt+1
￿
(4)
qtu ´ (Ct) = βEt{u ´ (Ct+1)(qt+1(1 − δ) + Zt+1)} (5)
Wt
Pt
u ´ (Ct) = −v ´ (Ht) (6)
6Equation 4 is the standard Euler conditions with respect to deposits. Equation 5 is the ﬁrst
order condition with respect to capital holding. Finally, equation 6 is the ﬁrst order condition
with respect to labour hours. The set of ﬁrst order conditions must hold alongside with a no-
Ponzi condition on wealth. Notice that for simplicity we prevented households from investing in
government bonds: in this case bond demand would come both from banks and households. Such
an additional assumption however is not going to change the main transmission mechanism between
sovereign and bank risk.
2.2 Final good ﬁrms
The ﬁnal goods in this economy are produced by a continuum of competitive ﬁrms operating under
a Cobb-Douglas production function, Yt = At(Ht)α(Kt)1−α, where At is an aggregate productivity
shock which follows an AR(1) process, α is the share of capital in production, Kt denotes rental
physical capital and Ht is the labour input. Each ﬁrm chooses production input optimally by
minimizing costs. Optimality conditions read as follows:
Wt
Pt
= mctAtα(Ht)α−1(Kt)1−α,Zt = mctAt(Ht)α(1 − α)(Kt)−α (7)
where mct is the lagrange multiplier on the production function and represents ﬁrms’ marginal
costs.
2.3 Capital good production
Entrepreneurs produce capital goods after acquiring funds from the bankers. The latter raise
funds through deposits and their own capital. The sections below provide details about the capital
production technology and the ﬁnancial contract behind the lending activity.
2.3.1 Bankers and entrepreneurs: utility and consumption
Bankers and entrepreneurs are both risk neutral and ﬁnite lived agents8. Their respective proba-
bility of exiting their business each period are γb and γe. Their respective worth at period t are
denoted BKt and NWt . We assume that both those agents consume their entire wealth when they
exit and save their entire wealth otherwise. This assumption is introduced as it facilitates wealth
8This assumption is needed to prevent that suﬃcient precautionary savings oﬀsets the external funding constraints.
7aggregation. For both agents indeed wealth is accumulated only through the surviving agents,
hence by law of large number aggregate wealth is given by the individual wealth weighted by the
survival probability. Similarly consumption is given by the wealth of agents who exit the economy
at time t conditional on being in the business at date t. Given risk neutrality, the sum of total
discounted expected utility respectively for bankers and entrepreneurs is given by:
V b
t = Et
+∞ ￿
i=1
γb
￿
1 − γb
￿i−1
BKt+i (8)
and
V e
t = Et
+∞ ￿
i=1
γe (1 − γe)
i−1 NWt+i (9)
2.4 The optimal contract
The ﬁnancial contract is an inter-temporal adaptation9 of the three party contract (involving de-
positors, entrepreneurs and bankers) in Holmstrom and Tirole [4]. It is assumed that the project
starts at the end of period t , that capital goods are produced at the beginning of period t+1 and
are then rented to intermediate good producers. Only after ﬁnal good production has taken place
does the proﬁt distribution occurs.
Entrepreneurs plan for an initial investment of It units of consumption good in period t, which
returns RIt units of capital goods at the beginning of period t+1 if the project succeeds and 0 units
if it fails. The entrepreneurs ﬁnances the project using partly his own funds, NWt, and partly by
borrowing, (It − NWt). If the project is successful, capital goods are rented to intermediate good
producers and the payoﬀs are distributed only afterwards to the parties involved. Entrepreneurs
can privately choose between three diﬀerent projects: a project with high probability of success ph
and 0 private beneﬁt, projects with low probability of success pl and private beneﬁts respectively
equal to bIt and BIt , with b < B. The bank can use a monitoring technology that prevents
the entrepreneur from undertaking the project with low probability of success pl and high private
beneﬁts BIt , but cannot prevent the ﬁrm from undertaking the project with low probability of
9We consider an inter-temporal contract as it allows us to consider the role that assets with risky returns (such
as government bonds), held in bankers’ balance sheet, can play in the intermediation process.
8success and lower private beneﬁts bIt
10 . Monitoring entails a non-veriﬁable cost cIt in ﬁnal goods
for the bank11. Costly monitoring creates a second moral hazard problem between the bank, on
the one side, and uniformed investors (depositors), on the other. Such moral hazard problem is
disciplined by the amount of bank capital invested in the project, BKt. The presence of moral
hazard on both sides of the contract allows both entrepreneurs and bankers to extract a rents,
which serve as incentive devices. Bankers raise funds through their own capital and depositors.
Part of the bankers funds is used to cover for the monitoring costs and part is used as asset buﬀer,
which we assume consisting of government bonds, (zt − 1)Bb
t (where Bb
t is the bankers demand
for government bonds and (zt − 1) is their risky price; we will return on the speciﬁcation of the
government bonds later on) . As a result of the above assumptions the feasibility constraint of the
project reads as follows:
(It − NWt) + (zt − 1)Bb
t ≤ BKt − cIt + Dt (10)
In equilibrium banks do pay the monitoring cost cIt−1, since, although it shrinks the available
funds to the project, it does ensure that entrepreneurs cannot shirk.
2.5 The ﬁnancial contract and proﬁt sharing
A three party contract among depositors, banks and entrepreneurs delivers a return of zero if the
project fails and a gross return, R, if the project succeeds. Total project (net) return is shared
according to the fractions sh
t ,se
t,sb
t, which sum up to one . Limited liability ensures that no agent
earns a negative return. Since the bank monitors ﬁrms, it is assumed ex-ante that projects succeed
with probability ph. This rules out the project with beneﬁt B. The ﬁrm is then left to choose
between the project with beneﬁt b and the one with zero beneﬁt.
Given the inter-temporal nature of the contract and in order to preserve the contract recursivity
we assume that only the entrepreneurs and the bankers which become aware of their exit from
business in the next period have an incentive to shirk. The assumption is reasonable, as non-
10Monitoring reduces the incentive to shirk, but not fully: this retain a role for entrepreneurial and bank capitalists
net worth as a discipline devices.
11Banks have access to a monitoring technology which takes diﬀerent forms: inspection of ﬁrms’ balance sheet
position and potential cash ﬂow, management quality, veriﬁcation that the ﬁrm conforms with ﬁnancial covenants,
etc..
9exiting entrepreneurs and bankers would suﬀer a reputational loss by shirking. This implies that
only exiting entrepreneurs need to be disciplined and that the incentive compatibility constraints
characterizing the contract will apply only to them. We will return on this point later.
Prior to outline the design of the contract, we shall characterize the inter-temporal payoﬀs
and the sharing rules to which all three agents involved in the contract agree ex ante. If a project
launched at date t succeeds, the total real pay-oﬀ at date t + 1 is:
Πsuccess
t+1 =
￿
rk
t+1 + qt+1 (1 − δ)
￿
RIt +
￿
1 + r
g
t+1
￿
πt+1
(zt − 1)Bb
t (11)
where
￿
1 + r
g
t+1
￿
is the risky return on government bonds and πt+1 is the inﬂation rate. Notice
that the additional asset buﬀer, Bb
t, is acquired by the bank only when engaging in the lending
activity. We can rewrite this payoﬀ to highlight the risky nature of government bonds:
Πsuccess
t+1 = ˆ Πsuccess
t+1 +
￿
r
g
t+1 − rn
t
￿
πt+1
(zt − 1)Bb
t (12)
where ˆ Πsuccess
t+1 =
￿
rk
t+1 + qt+1 (1 − δ)
￿
RIt +
(1 + rn
t )
πt+1
(zt − 1)Bb
t . The equation above shows
that changes in the price of government bonds and/or in the sovereign premia,
￿
r
g
t+1 − rn
t
￿
, do
aﬀects banks’ balance sheets by aﬀecting proﬁts from bond trading.
The three parties agree at date t to share the returns of the successful project in the following
way:
Πe
t+1 = se
t ˆ Πsuccess
t+1 (13)
Πb
t+1 = sb
t ˆ Πsuccess
t+1 +
￿
r
g
t+1 − rn
t
￿
Πt+1
(zt − 1)Bb
t
Πh
t+1 = sh
t ˆ Πsuccess
t+1
where sh
t = 1 − se
t − sb
t . The proﬁt shares will be chosen optimally within the three party
contract.
Entrepreneurs have all the bargaining power in the contract relation. The optimal contract, at
the beginning of period t , determines the investment size It, the banker’s participation BKt, the
depositor participation Dt, the liquidity buﬀer Bb
t and the shares of returns accruing respectively
10to the entrepreneur, the banker and the depositor se
t,sb
t,sh
t in order to maximize the entrepreneurs
expected return:
max
{It,BKt,Dt,Bb
t,se
t,sb
t,sh
t}
V e
t (14)
Subject to the following constraints.
First the entrepreneurs’ incentive constraint, which implies that the expected next period
returns from the choosing the project with high probability of success, ph, are higher than those
associated with the project with the low probability of success pl, but with private beneﬁt b:
Et
￿￿
rk
t+1 + qt+1 (1 − δ)
￿
phse
tRIt
￿
≥ Et
￿￿
rk
t+1 + qt+1 (1 − δ)
￿
plse
tRIt
￿
+ qtItb
qtphse
tRIt ≥ qtplse
tRIt + qtItb (15)
Second the bankers’ incentive constraint, which implies that bankers’ expected next period
returns when they perform the monitoring activity are higher than in absence of it:
Et
￿￿
rk
t+1 + qt+1 (1 − δ)
￿
phsb
tRIt
￿
≥ Et
￿￿
rk
t+1 + qt+1 (1 − δ)
￿
plsb
tRIt
￿
+ cIt
qtphsb
tRIt ≥ qtplsb
tRIt + cIt (16)
The third constraint is the bankers participation constraint, which at the beginning of time t
ensures that bankers engaging in the lending activity receive a future discounted sum of utilities
which is larger than the proceeds from an outside investment opportunity. We deﬁne the outside
investment opportunity through the following speciﬁcation: bankers invest initial wealth, BKt−1,
at a market rate
(1 + rm
t )
Πt+1
, exit the intermediation activity and consume all wealth available at
time t12:
V b
t ≥ BKt = BKt−1
(1 + rm
t )
Πt+1
(17)
12Following much of literature it is assumed that this constraint is never binding (something which we will verify
in the simulations). Thus, this equation does not constrain the optimization problem.
11The fourth constraint is represented by the investors’ participation constraint, which implies
that depositors prefer to enter the ﬁnancial contract than earning the risk-free return (policy rate):
Et
￿
Λt,t+1Πh
t+1
￿
≥ Et
￿
Λt,t+1
(1 + rn
t )
Πt+1
Dt
￿
(18)
sh
t .Et
￿
Λt,t+1
￿￿
rk
t+1 + qt+1 (1 − δ)
￿
phRIt + (1 + rn
t )(zt − 1)Bb
t
￿￿
≥ Dt
sh
t .
￿
qtphRIt + (zt − 1)Bb
t
￿
≥ Dt
Notice that depositors’ returns are initially weighted by their stochastic discount factor,
Λt,t+1 = β
u ´ (Ct+1)
u ´ (Ct) .
The contract is also subject to a feasibility condition which reads as follows.
It − NWt + (zt − 1)Bb
t ≤ BKt + Dt − cIt (19)
Monitoring costs cIt are paid at date t and directly impact the available amount of loanable
funds.
At last we need to consider the bank self-insurance against liquidity risk, whose rational and
derivation is described in appendix A:
(zt − 1)Bb
t ≥ ρtDt (20)
The above constraint states that the bank wants to maintain an asset buﬀer, due to regulatory
or precautionary motives, hence it invests in government bonds for an amount equivalent to the
share of potential deposit withdrawals, ρt.
Finally we also need to consider the returns distribution condition, according to which proﬁts
share are allocated linearly:
sh
t + se
t + sb
t = 1 (21)
The above contract is solved as follows. In equilibrium, equations (15) and (16) hold with
equality (see Holmström, B. and J. Tirole [4]), giving :
12se
t =
b
R(ph − pl)
(22)
and
sb
t =
c
qtR(ph − pl)
(23)
As a consequence, the share of returns accruing to depositors is the following:
sh
t = 1 −
b
R(ph − pl)
−
c
qtR(ph − pl)
(24)
Inequality (20) is also binding in equilibrium. Substituting it in (19), which is also binding,
yields:
It =
BKt + NWt + Dt − (zt − 1)Bb
t
(1 + c)
=
BKt + NWt + Dt(1 − ρt)
(1 + c)
(25)
The equation above clariﬁes the role of the insurance buﬀer and the eﬀects that changes on
government bond prices can have on banks’ decision and on the optimal investment schedule. A
fall in bond prices (due to an increase in its risk) when the self-insurance constraint binds implies
that banks can raise less deposits (for given probability of liquidity shock, ρt): this implicitly
reduces the available resources for investment. In response to a negative (or positive) aggregate
shock the fall (increase) in investment will be larger in presence of government bond risk: in this
case indeed the ﬂuctuations in the bond risk premium increase the sensitivity of short term banks’
funding (deposits), and consequently in banks’ assets (loans to investment projects) to aggregate
conditions. The eﬀects of of government bond risk will also be evaluated further below through the
numerical comparison of the model with and without bond risk.
From (18), we obtain the deposit to investment ratio:
Dt
It
=
sh
t qtphR
1 − sh
t .ρt
(26)
which, once merged with It =
BKt + NWt ￿
1 + c − (1 − ρt)
Dt
It
￿, provides the following optimal invest-
ment schedule:
13It =
BKt + NWt ￿
1 + c −
￿
1 − ρt
1 − sh
t .ρt
￿
qtphRsh
t
￿ (27)
Investment size It decreases when aggregate liquidity risk ρt increases. Although the price of
the bond, zt, does not enter explicitly the investment equation, it does aﬀect the bank’s leverage
ratio (Dt
It ) through the self-insurance constraint. Finally note also that the expression above for
investment is recursive because ρt does not depend on It (only on Rb
t/Rt i.e. on qt).
2.6 Bankers and entrepreneurial wealth accumulation
Bankers’ and entrepreneurs’ wealth accumulation consists of the aggregate wealth of non-exiting
bankers and entrepreneurs. Since wealth aggregation takes place at the of period t, it is useful to
recall the chain of events taking place in the model. At the beginning of period t an aggregate
capital stock Kt, which has been inherited from previous periods, is rented to ﬁnal good producers.
Production then takes place and gross interest rates on rented capital are paid back. Upon receipt
of returns, households make consumption and investment decision, while bankers sell and purchase
government bonds. A inter-temporal optimal ﬁnancial contract is then signed between bankers,
entrepreneurs and depositors (households). After the contract is signed, an idiosyncratic news
shocks εn,i,t realize and interbank lending takes place. At the end of the period projects’ returns,
R, are realized and shared between agents (sb
t, se
t and sh
t ). Entrepreneurs and bankers consume if
they exit the economy and invest in capital otherwise.
Period t capital of the bank is the sum of the proceeds from past period investment and the
previous period holdings of government bonds Bb
t sold at market value zt:
BKt = γb
￿
rk
t + qt (1 − δ)
￿
phRb
t−1qt−1It−1 + Πbonds
t (28)
where bank proﬁts linked to the holding of government bonds are :
Πbonds
t = δc (zt+1 − zt+1)Bb
t (29)
Government bonds are eﬀectively ex post risky assets. Their price zt can indeed ﬂuctuate due
to a default premium and a term premium (see details in the next section). An unexpected fall in
14the bond price zt generates a loss that aﬀects banks capital stock. Credit supply and investment in
the following periods will also be reduced13.As explained above the demand for government bonds
on the side of the bank comes from the need for an asset buﬀer, (zt − 1)Bb
t = ρtDt. If zt goes down,
Bb
t goes up: banking sector’s demand for government bonds increases in time of sovereign tension.
2.7 Long-term government bonds: prices and premia
Government bonds are inﬁnitely lived and pay each period a geometrically decreasing coupon,
whose rate of decay is δc.Let us denote zt the price of a bond paying a coupon of 1 in period t.We
have14:
zt = 1 + δcEt (Λt,t+1 (1 − ∆t+1)zt+1) (30)
where Λt,t+1 is the households discount factor and ∆t+1 is the expected default on government
debt in period t + 1 .The timing of events in the bond market at period t is as follows. The
default haircut ∆t is decided on previous period government debt Bt−1.Existing bonds are sold and
purchased at price zt and new bonds are issued. Coupons are paid to the current owners of the
bonds.
It is important to notice that due to coupon payment in period t , the eﬀective market value
of the bond once the coupon has been paid is only zt − 115. The duration of the inﬁnitely lived
bond presented above can be ﬁne-tuned using the parameter δc =
1
β
￿
1 −
1
1 + MacDur
￿
,where
MacDur is the Macaulay duration. For example, MacDur = 40 quarters is obtained by setting
δC = 0.9855.
One unit of bonds is purchased at a cost (zt − 1) and can be sold at price δczt+1 in the following
period. Therefore the ex-post return on bonds is given by:
1 + r
g
t = (1 − ∆t)
δczt
zt−1 − 1
(31)
13Note that Π
bonds
t is expected to be positive in steady-state for two reasons: a. government bonds pay a risk
premium because they are subject to default risk. b. government bonds also pay a term premium because they are
long assets.
14See Rudebusch and Swanson [6].
15Notice that ﬁnancial intermediaries purchase only bonds whose coupon has already been paid. Hence, the book
value of a quantity B
b
t of bonds will be (zt − 1)B
b
t.
15To compute the term premium in the model, we deﬁne two additional prices. The ﬁrst one is
the default-free rate zDF
t deﬁned as:
zDF
t = 1 + δcEt
￿
Λt,t+1zDF
t+1
￿
(32)
The second one is the risk-neutral rate, where the bond is priced using the risk-free rate rn
t :
zRN
t = 1 +
δc
1 + rn
t
Et
￿
zRN
t+1
￿
(33)
The term-premium can then be deﬁned as:
TPt = log
￿
δczDF
t
zDF
t−1 − 1
￿
− log
￿
δczRN
t
zRN
t−1 − 1
￿
(34)
2.8 Government debt accumulation
Real government debt evolves as follows:
BStock
t = BIssue
t +
δcBStock
t−1
Πt
(35)
New issuances are used to balance the government budget:
Tt
Pt
+ ztBIssue
t = 1 ∗ (1 − ∆t)BStock
t +
Gt
Pt
+
TC
t
Pt
(36)
Fiscal revenues come from taxes Tt and new bond issuance ztBIssue
t , whereas expenditures
come from government consumption Gt and the service of the debt stock BStock
t , including bonds
emitted in current period16. The government budget constraint can also be written as:
Tt
Pt
+ (zt − 1)BStock
t =
δcztBStock
t−1
Πt
+
Gt
Pt
(37)
In each period the government repays past debt BStock
t−1 at market price δczt and sells new
bonds BStock
t at price (zt − 1).
16Exogenous government spending is calibrated so that sovereign default never materializes, even though households
give a positive probability to this event.
162.9 Monetary and Fiscal Policy
We assume that monetary policy follows the traditional Taylor rule. As for the ﬁscal policy it acts
according to the following rules:
Tt
Pt
= τw
t
Wt
Pt
Ht (38)
(τw
t − τw) = φT
Y (Yt − Y ) + φT
B (Bt − B) (39)
We also assume that the bond market clears:
Bt = Bb
t + Bhh
t (40)
2.10 Calibration
This section is devoted to discuss the parameters and shock calibration used in quantitative simu-
lations of the next section.
Household preferences and production. The time unit is the quarter. The utility function of
households is U(Ct,Ht) =
C1−σ
t −1
1−σ + ν log(1 − Ht), with σ = 2, as it is in most real business cycle
literature aimed at capture risk aversion. The parameter ν is set equal to 6 and has been chosen
in such a way to generate a steady-state level of employment H ≈ 0.3. The discount factor is set
to β = 0.99, so that the annual real interest rate is equal to 4%. The production function is a
Cobb-Douglas, F(•) = Kα
t (Ht)1−α, with α = 0.3. The quarterly aggregate capital depreciation rate
δ is 0.025.
Banks. The parameters characterizing the contract among bankers, depositors and entre-
preneurs, ph,pl,c,R,b, and the wealth accumulation parameters, γe,γb, are calibrated as follows.
The ph is set equal to 0.9 to reproduce ﬁrms’ quarterly failure rate in industrialized countries, as
reported in most of the macro literature on ﬁrm dynamic and/or credit frictions. The remaining
parameters are set in the two models so as to induce the following steady state values. 1). A capital
adequacy ratio, BK
BK+D, of 19% in line with BIS data [2]. 2). A ratio of investment over output,
I
Y , approximately of 0.15, a value compatible with most RBC studies. 3). A ratio of capital over
output, K
Y , of 6.6, value set in accordance with ranges considered in the RBC literature. 4). A ratio
of investment over entrepreneurial net worth of, I
NW , equal to 2. And 5) a return on bank equities
(ROE), γb [Zt+1 + qt+1(1 − δ)]phRb
t, of 16%, a value compatible with data reported in Berger [3],
17who looks at historical averages, while the second value in the range is more in line with the higher
ROE observed in the decade prior to the 2007 crisis (see American Banking Association). 6). Banks
operating costs of 5 percent of investment. 7) A share of deposits subject to withdrawals of 0.2.
Sovereign risk and ﬁscal sector. Parameters in the ﬁscal rules are set as follows: φT
Y = 0;φT
B =
0.5.The expected sovereign bond premium, ∆t, is computed using a Beta distribution with the
following parameters, αBG = 3.70,βBG = 0.54,and a maximum debt to output ratio of 2.56.
Shocks. The shocks considered include the standard macro shocks (productivity and govern-
ment spending) as well as ﬁnancial and liquidity shocks. Productivity shock are modeled as AR(1)
processes, At = A
ρα
t−1 exp(εα
t ),where the steady-state value A is normalized to unity,ρα = 0.95 and
σεα = 0.008. Log-government consumption evolves according to the following exogenous process,
ln
￿
gt
g
￿
= ρg ln
￿
gt−1
g
￿
+ ε
g
t, where the steady-state share of government consumption, g, is set so
that
g
y = 0.25 and ε
g
t is an i.i.d. shock with standard deviation σg. Empirical evidence for the US
in Perotti 2004 suggests σg = 0.0074 and ρg = 0.9.
3 Quantitative results
The main goal of the paper is to check whether our model can replicate the stylized fact observed
in the data of a positive correlation between bank and sovereign risk. Prior to verify this, it
is instructive to analyze the transmission mechanism of the model by describing the behavior of
selected variables via impulse responses to standard macro shocks and/or to shocks to government
debt risk. Understanding the transmission mechanism of the model will also guide us in the
interpretation of the results related to the link between bank and sovereign risk.
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses of selected variables to a 1% (negative) technology shock
in the model with (dashed line) and without (solid line) risk on government bonds: comparing the
two models gives an idea of the impact that the interaction between bank and sovereign risk might
have onto the model.
As expected output, consumption and investment go down due to the contractionary nature
of the shock. When investment demand and the return to investment fall, both entrepreneurial
net worth and bank capital (not shown) fall. The bank capital ratio falls in the initial period, but
then raises again. The reason is as follows. As the scale of required investment falls, the amount of
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Figure 1: Impulse responses of selected variables to a 1% fall in aggregate productivity in the model
without (solid line) government bond risk and with (dashed line) it.
bank capital invested in the project falls on impact (by more than investment in the initial period).
The ensuing fall in asset prices increases the severity of the moral hazard problem, as it is more
diﬃcult to meet the incentive compatibility constraints for both the bank and the entrepreneur.
This implies that the share of returns from the project (Rb
t) accruing to the bank shall raise: as the
moral hazard raises, bankers can extract larger surpluses. The raise in the bankers’ returns induces
banks to raise the bank capital ratios. Overall bank capital behaves counter-cyclically, as it would
do under a Basel II-type capital requirement, but here as an endogenous result of market discipline:
as the moral hazard problem becomes more severe, banks increase capital and squeeze up liquidity.
The above description applies qualitatively to both models (with and without government bond
risk). However some diﬀerences in the quantitative properties arise. The recessionary eﬀects of the
shock are indeed much more pronounced when the model also features government bond spreads.
The fall in consumption, by aﬀecting the stochastic discount factor, produces a fall in the price of
the bond, zt, and in the ex-post banks’ returns from government bond trading. As a result, and
due to the self-insurance constraint, the amount of short-term liabilities (deposits) to which the
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Figure 2: Impulse responses of selected variables to a 1% fall in government spending in the model
without (solid line) government bond risk and with (dashed line) it.
bank can get exposed falls: the ensuing fall in the funds available for loans, produces a much larger
fall in investment in the model with government bond risk.
Figure 2 below shows impulse responses of selected variables to a 1% government spending
shock.
As expected output, investment, entrepreneurial wealth fall, while bank capital ratios and
bankers returns from the investment project raise. As before the ensuing fall in the price of
government bonds reduces bankers’ proﬁts from government bonds trading and the self-insurance
constraint forces banks to reduce their short term exposure. As before the severity of the recession
is much larger in presence of government bond risk.
3.1 The Link Between Bank and Sovereign Risk
Data show that in recent years (following the 2007 crisis) Europe has a experienced a positive
connection between sovereign and bank risks. As explained earlier one of the main reasons behind
such connection rests on the exposure of banks’ balance sheet to government bonds: since those
200 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16
1.4786
1.4786
1.4786
1.4786
1.4786
1.4786
1.4786
x 10
−3
Steady state probability of bank run
C
o
r
r
(
b
a
n
k
 
c
r
i
s
i
s
,
g
o
v
 
b
o
n
d
 
r
i
s
k
 
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
)
Figure 3: Correlation between bank risk and government bond risk in response to "news" shocks
aﬀecting banks’ returns uncertainty and for diﬀerent steady state values of ρ.
assets were considered Tier 1 capital, banks had a natural tendency to acquire them in order
to satisfy their regulatory capital requirements or simply for self-insurance motives. Clearly this
produces a two way interaction between banks’ liquidity risk and government bond risk. The ﬁrst
type of risk is captured in our model by the probability of deposit withdrawals, while the second
type of risk is proxied via government bond premia, calculated as r
g
t − rn
t .
Figure 3 shows the correlation between bank and sovereign risk in response to a shock, St, to
the uncertainty about expected bank returns, σε
t. The shock, St,which follows an AR(1) processes,
aﬀects banks’ liquidity risk (proxied by the probability of early deposit withdrawals) as follows:
ρt = 1 − Φ
￿
̟t
Stσε
t
￿
(41)
21The shock can be interpreted as "news" arrivals: an increase in St means that depositors
received news of higher uncertainty in banks’ proﬁts and might trigger early withdrawals. This
shall of course increase the probability that banks need emergency liquidity and implicitly could
aﬀect the self-insurance constraint. As ρt rises the self-insurance constraint forces banks to reduce
the amount of short term liabilities (Dt) available for investment thereby triggering a credit crunch:
as shown before credit crunch driven recessions are ampliﬁed in presence of sovereign risk.
Figure 3 shows the correlation between bank risk, ρt, and sovereign risk, proxied by r
g
t − rn
t ,
in response to St shocks and for diﬀerent values of the banks’ liquidity risk in the steady state,
ρ. The underlying idea is that the more an economy is prone to banking crisis (higher steady
state ρ), the higher should be the spiraling connection between bank and government bond risk.
Notice that the diﬀerent values of the probability of bank run (in the steady state) were computed
by referring to evidence in Qian, Reinhart and Rogoﬀ [?]. The average probability of a bank run
is 8% with a standard deviation of 7%. The range for the steady state bank run was set as the
average probability plus and minus 1%. The diﬀerent dots in the graph represent the correlations
(between ρ and r
g
t − rn
t ) resulting from the model solution in response to the "news" shocks and
for diﬀerent values of the steady state value of ρ. The graph also shows the OLS regression line
which is positively sloped (R2 is 0.6885). The model can then well replicate the positive association
between bank risk and government bond risk and also shows that such correlation increases with
the fragility of the banking system.
Figure 4 shows the correlation between bank risk, ρt, and sovereign risk, proxied by r
g
t −rn
t , in
response to St shocks and for diﬀerent values of government default haircuts. The relation shows
that the connection between the two sources of risk in the model is exacerbated under weaker
fundamentals, in this case under higher long run sovereign risk.
4 Central bank liquidity interventions
The central bank, aware of the liquidity emergency needs, comes in assistance of banks through
interventions based on full allotment in the repo market. Such interventions lead to easing in credit
supply conditions. If the central bank accepts government bonds in repo at price zt > zt (because
its own estimate of government default risk is lower than the one of households) the liquidity buﬀer
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Figure 4: Correlation between bank risk and government bond risk in response to "news" shocks
aﬀecting uncertainty of banks’ returns and for diﬀerent values of the haircut on government bonds.
23that banks need to maintain is smaller than when reﬁnancing is done via the interbank market.
B
g
t =
ρtDt
(zt − 1)
< Bb
t (42)
The optimal ﬁnancial contract in this case delivers the following solution. The optimal invest-
ment schedule becomes:
It =
BKt + NWt ￿
1 + c −
￿
1−
￿
zt
¯ zt
￿
ρt
1−sh
t
￿
zt
¯ zt
￿
ρt
￿
qtphRsh
t
￿ (43)
with:
Dt = It
sh
t qtphR
1 − sh
t
￿
zt
¯ zt
￿
ρt
(44)
Ex-post bankers’ returns on bond trading and bankers’ consumption should change accordingly
into:
Πbonds
t = γbδc  ztBb
t−1 (45)
Cb
t =
￿
1 − γb
￿￿
qtphRbIt + (  zt − 1)Bb
t
￿
(46)
Since the policy aﬀects equilibrium bond spreads and prices, the government budget constraint
should also be changed to take into account that the government can now save on bond service
costs:
Tt
Pt
+   ztBIssue
t = 1 ∗ (1 − ∆t)BStock
t +
Gt
Pt
+
TC
t
Pt
(47)
This policy of full allotment at a "distorted" price is a form of subsidy to the private sector,
equivalent to a reduction in the aggregate uncertainty parameter ρt by a factor
￿
zt
zt
￿
.The central
bank might ﬁnd optimal to trade at a price zt > zt if, for example, government debt held in its
balance sheet is senior with respect to debt held in the private banks’ balance sheet or if the central
bank possesses superior information, compared to market participants, about the ﬁscal situation.
To analyze the eﬃcacy of such policy in reducing the spiraling connections between bank and
sovereign risk we re-examine some of the previous numerical results by considering the model in
which sovereign bond risk is present. First we re-consider the eﬀects of technology and government
spending shocks using impulse response functions. In this case we compare model results with and
without central bank intervention. Figures 5 and 6 show results respectively for the technology
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions to technology socks of selected variables in the model with
government bond risk by comparing the case with central bank intervention (dashed line) with no
central bank intervention (solid line).
and government spending shocks by comparing the model with central bank intervention (solid
line) and without central bank intervention (dashed line). The qualitative response of macro and
banking variables is roughly equivalent to the one observed in absence of central bank intervention,
but the recessionary extent of the shocks is milder under central bank interventions.
Under both, technology and government spending shocks, the fall in output and consumption
is milder over the medium run due to the positive wealth eﬀects of the repo operations. In addition
under central bank intervention the value of banks’ capital buﬀer increases, hence banks can more
easy leverage at short maturities increasing the amount of deposits (relatively to the case with no
central bank interventions) and consequently reducing the fall in investment.
Much of the allotment policies by the ECB were conducted to counteract the recessionary
eﬀects due to increases in countries’ government spreads. For this reason we also simulate impulse
response functions to a 1% increase in government bond spreads (see Figure 7 below). In this case
full allotment policy is fully eﬀective in neutralizing the eﬀects of the increase in government risk.
Bankers consumption, proﬁts as well as the value of capital buﬀer remain stable ensuring that no
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Figure 6: Impulse response functions to government spending shocks of selected variables in the
model with government bond risk by comparing the case with central bank intervention (dashed
line) with no central bank intervention (solid line).
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Figure 8: Correlation between bank risk and government bond risk under central bank intervention
and in response to "news" shocks aﬀecting banks’ returns uncertainty and for diﬀerent steady state
values of ρ.
contraction in short term banks’ liquidity (Dt) takes place.
The shock transmission mechanisms outlined above show that central bank interventions might
be particularly eﬀective in reducing the exacerbation eﬀects associated with government bond risk
as well as in neutralizing the eﬀects of government bond spread shocks. By dampening govern-
ment risk, central bank is eﬀectively also dampening banks’ liquidity risk: for given ρ, the bonds’
regulated price oﬀered by the central bank raises and stabilizes the banks’ capital buﬀer values,
thereby reducing ﬂuctuations in short term banks’ funding (Dt). This eventually reduces the spi-
raling correlation between sovereign and bank risk. Figures 8 and 9 show the correlation between
bank liquidity risk and sovereign risk equivalent to the ones considered in Figures 5 and 6, but this
time in presence of central bank allotment policy. The correlations are still positive but they are
lower than in absence of central bank intervention and they do not show any increase with respect
to changes in the long run value of bank liquidity risk and/or the haircut on government bonds.
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Figure 9: Correlation between bank risk and government bond risk under central bank intervention
and in response to "news" shocks aﬀecting uncertainty of banks’ returns and for diﬀerent values of
the haircut on government bonds.
5 Conclusions
The euro area sovereign debt crisis and its consequences on exposed banks is producing spiralling
connections between bank and sovereign risk. We propose a macro model with banks which ex-
perience a dual moral hazard problem between depositors on the one side and ﬁrms on the other
and invest in government bonds as part of its self-insurance policy against liquidity risk. The
emergence of sovereign risk aﬀects the value of private banks’ buﬀer capital, thereby aﬀecting its
balance sheet and the resources available to investment. The model can re-produce the positive
correlation between bank and sovereign risk under diﬀerent degrees of banks fragility.
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296 Appendix 1: Liquidity Risk and Regulatory Buﬀer for Bankers
Bankers in our model face the risk of sudden liquidity needs due to deposit withdrawals. Given this
liquidity risk, when engaging in the lending activity intermediaries decide to hold an asset buﬀer,
which is justiﬁed either by regulatory requirements or through self-insurance.
We assume N identical banks start operating at the beginning of period t . Each bank owns
1
N
of total capital BKt , receives
1
N
of total deposits Dt and ﬁnances
1
N
of the total investment
It.
At the beginning of period t banks operate a ﬁnancial contract, through which it engages in
the lending activity to entrepreneurs (details of the contract are in the main text). Contract com-
mitments are rigid (projects ﬁnanced through the contracts cannot be liquidated between periods),
but across subsequent periods banks face the risk that deposited funds can be withdrawn17. Let
us assume depositors in each single bank n are represented by a continuum of mass 1. Variables
speciﬁc to the investor i in the bank n are denoted using the subscript n,i . After ﬁnancial con-
tracts have been signed, banks become heterogenous. A fraction π of banks is subject to "market
rumors": depositors receive a private signal εn,i,t (news shocks) about the expected probability
that the project funded by bank n will succeed, ph.
En,i,t (ph) = exp(−εn,i,t)ph (48)
The signal εn,i,t follows the distribution Γt with density function gt and cumulative distribution
Gt . This distribution is the same for all depositors i and banks n . Under this notation, a
positive shock εn,i,t represents bad news about the bank. Depositors withdraw their funds from
bank n when the expected return on investment En,i,t (ph) is so low that the bank could become
insolvent18. Speciﬁcally, investors do not roll-over their funding when expected losses are higher
than the share due to bankers, that is when (1 − exp(−εn,i,t))phRtqtIt > phRb
tqtIt or equivalently
when εn,i,t > ̟t = ln
￿
Rt
Rt − Rb
t
￿
19 . For any bank n, the share of withdrawing depositors is:
17Deposit wtihdrawals do not entail resource destruction in our model, as deposits are simply moved from one bank
to another.
18We assume that banks liabilities are uninsured, or equivalently that the insurance scheme is not credible.
19As all banks are ex-ante identical, we can drop the subscript n in the inequalities.
30ρt =
￿ +∞
̟t
gt (ε).dε = 1 − Gt (̟t) (49)
We introduce liquidity needs into the model with the sole purpose of providing justiﬁcation
for an ex ante banks’ asset buﬀer. For this reason we include a number of assumptions to isolate
the negotiation on the ﬁnancial contract from the news shock distribution. First, we assume that
deposit withdrawals on one bank do not entail panics for the entire banking sector. This is so since
cash withdrawn from a troubled bank are transferred onto banks perceived to be safe: deposit
inﬂows into safe banks are exactly equivalent to deposit outﬂows from troubled banks and there is
no destruction of resources at an aggregate level. Finally notice that, under rational expectations,
shocks εn,t ∼ Γt should entail ex post diﬀerent banks’ proﬁts distribution. We assume that all extra-
proﬁts (for banks with εn,t < 0) are put in a common guarantee fund and distributed to banks
undergoing losses (εn,t > 0). Ex post pooling of proﬁts, implies that ex ante the shock realization,
εn,t does not aﬀect banks’ ﬁnancial contract negotiation, on which we can assume symmetry.
When the liquidity withdrawal takes place, bank n borrows from the interbank market an
amount BDt = ρtDt. Prior to the deposit withdrawal, bank n balance sheet reads as follows:
Before deposit withdrawal
Assets (*N) Liabilities (*N)
Lt Dt
(zt − 1)Bb
t BKt
After the deposit withdrawal, bank n balance sheet reads as follows:
After deposit withdrawal
Assets (*N) Liabilities (*N)
Lt (1 − ρt)Dt
(zt − 1)Bb
t BKt
BDt = ρtDt
Borrowing in the interbank market is granted only against an asset collateral (which we as-
sume taking the form of government bonds)20. The following collateral requirement is imposed to
borrowing banks:
BDt ≤ (zt − 1)Bb
t (50)
20Since individual deposit withdrawals do not induce a destruction of aggregate liquidity, banks in need of liquidity
will surely ﬁnd counterparts in the repo market.
31which results in the following constraint for the bank:
ρtDt ≤ (zt − 1)Bb
t (51)
Notice that ρt measures the riskiness of bank funding as well as the size of the necessary
liquidity buﬀer.
ρt = 1 − Gt (̟t) (52)
Consider the case in which Γt = N (0,σε
t). This implies that:
ρt = 1 − Φ
￿
̟t
σε
t
￿
(53)
The higher the uncertainty about expected bank returns σε
t, the higher the need for liquidity
in the banking sector.
6.0.1 Monetary policy 2: full allotment
Banks subject to rumors loose a part of their deposit and an equivalent amount is deposited to
banks perceived as safe. These safe banks keep their extra cash at the central bank deposit facility
(amount mt) and the central bank provides liquidity to troubled banks in the repo market.
Troubled banks Safe banks Central bank
(fraction π) (fraction 1 − π)
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
π.Lt π.Dt − t (1 − π)Lt (1 − π)Dt + t
π.(zt − 1)Bb
t π.BKt (1 − π)(zt − 1)Bb
t (1 − π)BKt CBLoant mt
CBDebtt (= t) mt (= t)
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